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Rediscovering Gabriel Tarde
n

ELIHU KATZ

Gabriel Tarde (l843–1904) is thought to have “lost” his debates with Durkheim
by insisting that sociology ought to occupy itself with observable interpersonal
processes. Given contemporary interest in such processes—much abetted by the
computer—Tarde’s reputation is being rehabilitated. Terry Clark (1969) was first
to notice that Tarde (1898) had anticipated Lazarzfeld’s two-step flow of
communication. Tarde’s work has bearing on social networks, interpersonal
influence, diffusion of innovation, and the aggregation of public opinion.
Keywords communication theory, public opinion, classical tradition, conversation,
political discourse

During the oral exam on my doctoral thesis—later to become Part 1 of Personal
Influence—Robert Merton asked me to name the scholar who debated Durkheim on the
nature of sociology. It was the one question to which I had no answer. This failure is all the
more embarrassing now, 50 years later, in as much as intellectual historians such as Terry
Clark(1969) and Serge Moscovici (1985) pay homage to the French social psychologist,
Gabriel Tarde, for having anticipated the “two-step flow of communication” and other
propositions in the classic Columbia voting studies by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and Berelson
et al. (1954) and in Personal Influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). At least in some measure,
it accounts for my many years of ardent advocacy of Tarde’s all but forgotten work on
opinion and communication. But penance aside, the rediscovery of this forefather—not just
by me—has amply justified the effort. His renewed presence can enliven almost every aspect
of current work on political communication, on diffusion of innovation, on social network
theory, on public opinion, on collective behavior, and on the deliberative democracy of the
“public sphere.”
Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904) achieved renown in turn-of-the-century France. To his
professional training in the law, he added criminology, statistics, and social psychology, and
moved from the provincial courtroom of his aristocratic forebears to the College de France.
“Tarde held virtually every leader position open to a French social scientist outside the
university system,” says Terry Clark. While he published on a wide variety of sociological
and philosophical issues in France, his best-known work, The Laws of Imitation (1880), was
translated into English only in 1903, 1 year before his death. In the first half of the new
century, his ideas were rather well known and appreciated among American sociologists and
anthropologists interested in questions of interaction, diffusion, crowds, and publics. This is
well documented in Clark (1969, pp. 62–69) and in Sorokin (1928, 1941).1 His reputation
gradually faded, however, not only in the United States but in France as well. And yet, there
are signs of revival in both countries.

Why Tarde’s Reputation Waned
It is widely believed that Tarde’s debates with Durkheim in 1902 to 1904 were the beginning
of his undoing. In a word (Lukes, 1972; Clark, 1969), Durkheim argued that sociology should
be conceptualized on a level of its own, one that avoids reduction to individual-level
psychology. Tarde argued that society is made up of individuals, and that the social
psychology of their interaction brings about social structures and change. Durkheim focused
on the norms that constrain behavior, as if these were imposed from somewhere “outside,”
while Tarde saw these norms as the products of interaction. Both Clark and Lukes remark
that these two positions are not in necessary disagreement and, moreover, it is not at all clear
that Tarde “lost” the debates. This is even more obvious nowadays when seething social
networks are being uncovered everywhere—in science, in bureaucracy, in politics—thanks to
microsociological theory and the wonders of the computer (e.g., Burt, 1987). In this sense
Tarde may rise again; at the very least, he deserves a retrial.
A second explanation for the decline in Tarde’s popularity points a finger at his
unfortunate use of the concept “imitation,” which, on the face of it, is strictly out of favor. It
sounds altogether too mechanistic and unthinking, although it may well be that he had
“influence”—a better word—in mind. Moreover, and in spite of its mechanical sound,
Tarde’s “imitation” seems to place rather heavy emphasis on voluntarism, especially after
society became more egalitarian (Moscovici, 1985). As in the debate with Durkheim, external
constraints—not only normative, but coercive—are seemingly ignored in favor of
follow-the-leader. This, as it happens, echoes one of the reasons for the ups and downs of
diffusion research: Studies of diffusion have too often assigned the spread of change to
individual decisions to “adopt.” Rightly or wrongly, Durkheim’s ostensible victory, together
with the academically incorrect concept of “imitation”—and the connection between the
two—help us understand, or at least to ponder, the reversal of Tarde’s scientific reputation.
Sorokin (1928, p. 636) feels that he was not scientific enough from the outset.
Why and Where Tarde Is Resurfacing
Let me indicate several of the areas in which Tarde is being rediscovered and/or where he
usefulness of his ideas. In doing so, I will draw on what I have learned from The Laws of
Imitation and, especially, from his (1898/1989) “Opinion and Conversation,” which my
students and I have been studying line by line (Katz et al., 1998).2 I am only casually
acquainted with most of the rest of his writings, except for the translated excerpts and
discussion in Clark (1969) and secondary sources.
Mass Communication
To begin at my own beginning, let’s revisit Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social
Research at Columbia University. In The People’s Choice, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) made the
serendipitous discovery that personal influence was still a force to reckon with, even in the
era of mass communication. In his study of how voters made up their minds in the 1940
presidential election, he found that respondents implicated their close associates—family and

friends—in their decisions, no less, perhaps more, than they attributed influence to the radio
and to newspapers. In a further step, he discovered that these influentials—he called them
“opinion leaders”—were themselves more exposed (and influenced?) by the media than were
those whom they had influenced. He called this “the two-step flow of communication,”
suggesting that the media may exert indirect influence via intermediaries who vet the
messages they receive and selectively pass them along to their primary groups. As we know
now, this is the role that Tarde (1898) assigned to conversation. Tarde was not so much
interested in leading and following, but in the proposition that “if people did not talk, it would
be futile to publish newspapers . . . they would exercise no durable or profound influence;
they would be like a vibrating string without a sounding board” (in Clark, 1969, p. 307).
Lazarsfeld certainly had knowledge of Tarde—I know this, as a student, despite my
failings—even though Lazarsfeld reported to Clark, in a personal communication, that he and
his associates were unfamiliar with Tarde’s relevance “at the time” (Clark, 1969, p. 69),
presumably referring to the 1940 election study.
This resonates with the explicit reference to Tarde in Voting (Berelson et al., 1954), the
1948 sequel. “When The People’s Choice was written,” according to the authors (p. 300),
“this side of Tarde’s ideas was not known to the authors. . . . He felt that careful empirical
study of conversations was basic to sociology; and he suggested a large number of
hypotheses as to who talked to whom about what and how much, and in terms of the social
characteristics of the interlocutors and of variations in the historical scene.” Methodologically,
the authors concluded, “the correct solution is to make the conversation—the pair or group of
interlocutors—the unit of analysis. This brings us back, full circle, to thinking which parallels
Tarde’s ideas.”
And, indeed, in the Decatur study reported in Personal Influence, the role of
conversation and the two-step flow were investigated in realms of decision making other than
voting. As pointed out in Part 1 of the book, this was a time when other areas of social
research—industrial sociology, military studies, psychotherapy—were also discovering the
persistence of primary groups in modern society, as Tarde never doubted.
Thus did the Lazarsfeld studies carry the word of Tarde into the fertile field of network
theory. Once sociometry could be incorporated into social surveys—as the Decatur studies
had begun to do—it became possible to explore the flow of influence as a function of the
interaction of individuals, social networks, and mass media.
Diffusion Research
One of the applications of burgeoning network theory is the study of diffusion of innovation.
Tarde, like Simmel (1904/1957), proposed that change—in fashion, for example—followed a
trickle-down pattern, progressing from higher to lower strata. In fact, the Decatur study found
otherwise—except, perhaps, in the political realm; recently, Diana Crane (1999, 2000) also
found otherwise.
Gradually, then, the methodology of Lazarsfeld’s decision studies could be transformed
into full-blown studies of the diffusion of innovation. Studies of the spread of fluoridation
(Crain et al., 1969) and of the progress of a new antibiotic in communities of doctors
(Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1966) could show the joint workings of mass media and personal

influence—Tarde’s conversation—in the context of public and private health. Network
theorists and market researchers have replicated the drug study several times with varying
results, of which Burt’s (l987) “structural equivalence”—connecting diffusion research with
research on social capital—has evoked major interest. Granovetter’s (1973) “weak ties” was
an early forerunner of these ideas. Duncan Watts’s (2003) newer work has only recently
acknowledged this aspect of its heritage.
Interest in patterns of diffusion may be said to characterize all of the social sciences and
most of the humanities and some of the hard sciences as well—whether it is in the spread of
disease, or children’s games, or of religions. Tarde and Sorokin (1928) were well aware of
the similarities (and differences) among these problems, and of their centrality for the study
of change. Rural sociology’s concern for the role of agricultural extension in the diffusion of
new farm practices alludes to the paternity of Tarde. The late Everett Rogers’s (1995)
exhaustive review of thousands of diffusion studies acknowledged the inspiration of Tarde;
so does Kinnunen (1996). On the other hand, Stark’s (1997) masterful study of the diffusion
of early Christianity, for example, showed no awareness of the tradition on which it built.
Interpersonal Influence
Pondering the flow of influence in diffusion networks leads one to wonder whether Tarde’s
“imitation” is as far off as it sounds. Of course, much of social psychology is about
interpersonal influence, where the word imitation hardly figures. Yet, there is good reason to
think of imitation as one of the forms that influence may take. Ironically, a flaw in the design
of the Decatur study made this clear. Recall that the Decatur interviewers were instructed to
confirm alleged episodes of interpersonal influence by interviewing both parties to the
transaction (i.e., both influencee and influential). Whenever one or the other failed to confirm
his or her alleged role, the authors reported this failure, implicitly questioning whether
influence had actually transpired. This protocol in the research design shut out the possibility
that influence may occur without the knowledge of the influential, the influencee, or both.
Consider fashion decisions, for example, where an influencee may imitate some piece of an
influential’s attire or behavior without the influential’s knowledge. Indeed, social psychology
is replete with examples of “identification” and other forms of following of which the
“leader” may be unaware (e.g., Kelman, 1958, 1961; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
There is a fourfold table lurking in these thoughts.3 Suppose that God knows that A has
influenced B. But does A know that he or she has been influential? Is B aware that he or she
has been influenced?

The fruitfulness of this typology—hardly even referenced in Personal Influence—is (a) in
giving an operational definition to different aspects of influence, (b) in showing that the
language is smarter than we are in providing different names for these different influence
types, and (c) in making clear that new methods are needed for the study of interpersonal
influence inasmuch as one party to an influence transaction may be unaware of, or may deny,
the role that he or she has actually played. Indeed, influence may have transpired even when
both parties are unaware of their roles, as the table and the language make clear. We call this
“contagion.” So do epidemiologists. And students of collective behavior.
Public Opinion
Outside the laboratory, social research certainly has room for “imitation.” Elisabeth
Noelle-Neumann (1984), notably, has invoked Tarde explicitly in her assertion that people do
not wish to be “alone” in their opinions, and while they may not jump onto the majority
bandwagon, they will withdraw into silence and seeming conformity.4 Tarde was interested in
the manufacture of public opinion—not its product, but its process. He saw opinion arising,
initially, from the “conversation” between an individual and his or her newspaper, and then
further refined in the fellowship of the coffee house or salon, and then gradually merging into
one or two “public opinions.” Lord Bryce (DeFleur, 1988) added the smoking car of
commuter trains to these sites of opinion exchange and consolidation. What distinguished
Tarde from other theorists was his interest in the aggregation of opinion. He did not solve
this puzzle, but at least he recognized it as something different from foot in the door opinion
polling.
Public Space
It was in his later work that Tarde (in Clark, 1969, pp. 277–294) moved from trickle-down
imitation to greater mutuality of influence, and from crowd to public. For Tarde, the public
constituted a group that rallies round a shared identity and an issue—much like a crowd. But
whereas a heterogeneous crowd arises from momentary and single-minded interaction around
some event, the public is a more homogeneous, more contemplative product of a press that
creates a union of readers around issues that are “sublimated around issues and passions . . .
and not around interests” (in Clark, 1969, p. 285). While he was fascinated by the idea of

newspaper readers imagining their fellow readers reacting as they do, he allowed for their
coming together for sociability around their “common information and enthusiasms.” In other
words, Tarde credited the press for creating “the age of the public” and—differing from
LeBon—putting an end to the age of the crowd.
Unlike Habermas (1989), Tarde was not explicitly concerned with the workings of a
deliberative democracy. Yet, like Habermas—but 50 years earlier—Tarde analyzed the
system of interacting components that define “public space.” The system consists of (a) press,
(b) conversation, (c) opinion, and (d) action. To the press, he assigned the role of creating a
public—even, like Anderson (1983), the role of creating a nation.5 The press, then, sets an
agenda for the conversation of the cafes. Opinions are clarified and crystallized in these
conversations, and then translated into actions in the world of politics, fashion, consumer
behavior, and so forth. At the collective level, these public opinions—reincorporated into the
press—constitute a “brake on government.”
Tarde’s deliberative democracy—though unintended, so to speak—fits Habermas pretty
well. Unlike Habermas, however, Tarde’s ostensibly purposeless conversations were not
necessarily political, although politics was one of their major latent functions. To enter
Habermas’s public space, one has to divest oneself of status, power, and identity and come
equipped only with reasonableness and a commitment to the commonweal. Tarde’s public
space is much more casual and only incidentally occupied with problem solving, even though
this is one of its consequences. It is tempting to say that for Habermas, reason (which we all
possess, potentially) is a prerequisite to conversation; for Tarde, reason is better thought of as
a product of conversation, in the sense that participants in Tardean conversation emerge with
more considered opinions than the ones with which they entered. But, however tantalizing
this sounds, it is probably better to argue that the two men came to similar conclusions (Kim,
1997).
Following this model of public space, Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) attempted to test the
propositions that (a) frequency of media use increases frequency of conversation, (b)
conversation leads to more “considered opinion,” and (c) holders of more considered
opinions are more active in the political process. Unfortunately constrained by a one-time
survey, we tried these hypotheses, nevertheless, on a random sample of American adults.
Findings suggested that all three hypotheses hold, even if we encountered considerable
difficulty in finding a satisfactory measure of “considered opinion,” one that could be shown
to result from political talk. Consistency, for example, did not seem to follow from
conversation. The best of our measures—the one that best reflected the product of
conversation—was a respondent’s knowledgeability of opinions that go counter to his or her
own. As far as we could tell, Tarde did well on this empirical test.
In conclusion, canonic texts are classics that have persisted in their relevance, not only
because they engender consensus but because they are still worth arguing over. Scientists are
wary of canonizing texts for fear that they will stunt further growth. But we can show, I
believe, that the loss of classic texts is the greater danger—at least in social science.6
So what are “forgotten classics”? These are once-famous texts that have been superseded
or discredited or have fallen out of fashion. Why, then, are they rediscovered? And how?
Extrapolating from the present case—that is, from the essay on “Opinion and
Conversation”—it takes a mentor or a critic or a well-wisher to point out to a prospective

colleague that he or she is walking in the footsteps of, or standing on the shoulders of, an
ancestor who might be worth rehabilitating. It helps to have a well-informed loyalist, like
Terry Clark, to serve as a medium.7 This works especially well when the newcomer and the
forebear stand together on one side of the renewed outbreak of an argument. In the present
case, the argument is over impersonal versus interpersonal influence—or, better, how to
relate the two.8
Of course, “forgotten texts” also have a Rip Van Winkle function. They allow us to ask
what, if anything, do we know now that is different or better?

Notes
1. Jaap van Ginneken (1992) includes a brilliant chapter on Tarde in his Crowds,
Psychology and Politics. Its publication follows on the heels of a new French edition of
L’opinion et la foule, with an introduction by Dominick Reynie (1989).
2. In addition to the large excerpts in Clark (1969), we have been working from a full
translation by Ruth Morris, as yet unpublished, for which we owe thanks for financial
support to Peter Clarke, former dean of the Annenberg School at the University of Southern
California.
3. Only after submitting the present paper for publication did I become aware that this
typology appeared in print in a paper by my former associate, Herbert Hamilton (1971),
giving due credit. It is reproduced here by permission of the Oxford University Press. It also
appears in Gabriel Weimann (1994, p. 53).
4. Moscovici (1985, p. 38) cites an important passage from Tarde granting that,
ostensibly, “there is nothing more intoxicating than the sense of freedom, of the
non-necessity of any submission to others. . . . [However] the truth is that for most men there
is an irresistible sweetness inherent in obedience, credulity, and almost lover-like servility.”
Erich Fromm’s (1941) Escape from Freedom echoes this assertion in discussing how the
newly emancipated masses spurned their freedom to choose.
5. Tarde argued that the press created not only the public but the nation, and in this he
was followed by Anderson. He believed that the press overthrew the king by displacing his
coordinating functions, and by making one nation out of separate regions it achieved
majority rule in the parliament. These points are discussed in Katz (1998).
6. See Katz et al. (2004) for discussions of canonization in communications research,
especially the paper by Illouz (2004).
7. In their study of longevity of the reputations of artists, Lang and Lang (1990) discuss
the advantages of having an advocate.
8. Mutz (1998) despairs of the salience of interpersonal influence in the political arena
and believes that the media provide a better answer. Schudson (1997) despairs of both.
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